

XXI.—Rome's Choice of Magistrates During the Hannibalic War

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This paper is summarized in the last paragraph.

A survey of the Hannibalic War shows that the military situation was the paramount factor in the choice of Roman magistrates between 218 and 201. Experienced generals and former consuls were constantly recalled to active leadership. The important civil posts were filled by men who could be spared from the field of battle. The special exemptions, frequent prorogations, and numerous reelections were a direct reflection of some emergency or particular need. Finally it is significant that when a special emergency required additional, or particularly able leaders, the voters, whatever their political allegiance, consistently elected the most competent candidates available. The political manoeuvring during that period must have been restricted accordingly. Schur¹ finds that three cliques, the Fabian, the Fulvio-Claudian, and the Aemilio-Scipionic, greatly influenced Rome's election and appointment of magistrates during the war with Hannibal. There are, however, certain fallacies in the method which Schur and Münzer,² whom he follows, have used to determine the membership of those cliques.³ First, colleagues in a magistracy would not necessarily have belonged to the same political faction. Neither is there political significance in the fact that sons whose fathers or grandfathers had held office together were themselves colleagues. To a certain extent this would have been normal in the Roman republic when the requirements of the *cursus honorum* brought members of the leading families to office at approximately the same age in each generation. Second, although the presiding magistrate at an election could, and sometimes did influence the vote, the successful competitors would not automatically have been members of his faction. Finally,

¹ *Scipio Africanus und die Begründung der römischen Weltherrschaft* (Leipzig, 1927) 2-68; 105-131. This book will hereafter be referred to as *S. A.*

² *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart, 1920) 1-7 and *passim*. This book will hereafter be referred to as *Adelsp.*

³ R. M. Haywood, "Studies on Scipio Africanus," *The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, 51 (1933) 45-47.

during the Second Punic War there were cases where allegiance to the State, or the ambition of an individual, took precedence over loyalty to a particular clique or partisan. Yet Schur is right in observing that from 218 to 201 the Fabii, Claudii, and Corneli, dominated the political scene at Rome and that other leading families seem to have aligned themselves with them as occasion arose. How significant the influence of the particular cliques which Schur describes really was can best be determined by testing his method on the fallacies just mentioned and checking his arguments against the demand for competent leadership which the war with Hannibal created. This discussion will be arranged in chronological order.

Apparently neither Schur nor Münzer attach any special political significance to the consular elections for 217. After the Roman defeat at the Trebia the consul Ti. Sempronius Longus returned to Rome to preside over the electoral comitia. The emergency favored generals who aspired to a second consulship, yet was not serious enough to disqualify competent but less experienced candidates. To the latter category belonged the patrician consul Cn. Servilius Geminus, and to the former his plebeian colleague, C. Flaminius. Cn. Servilius was not responsible for the disaster at Lake Trasimene; he achieved a measure of success in his naval operations of that summer, and his command was prorogued for 216 when he served ably at Cannae.⁴ Flaminius had already proved himself a successful and courageous leader.⁵ In planning the campaign for 217, the Romans placed their hopes in two consular armies, fighting on terrain unsuited to the cavalry manoeuvres which Hannibal had employed so successfully.⁶ Their confidence is reflected in the normal selection of praetorian provinces and praetors, and in the failure to call on an experienced general to succeed P. Cornelius Scipio. Recognizing, however, the strategic importance of Spain,

⁴ In this paper references to ancient sources will be cited only for the controversial points under discussion. Full citations are given in my dissertation, *Roman Magistrates during the Second Punic War*, which is on file in the Library of Bryn Mawr College. The material will be published in a volume of *Fasti of Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (see *PAPhA* 72, page xx).

⁵ See note 4. Flaminius had also won favor with the plebs by the land law of his tribunate, had increased his renown by building the circus and road which bore his name, and finally had brought himself again into the spotlight by sponsoring the plebiscite which restricted the maritime trade of senators.

⁶ B. L. Hallward, *CAH* 8.44f.

they sent P. Scipio with proconsular imperium to aid in his brother's successful campaign there.

When in the crisis following the battle of Lake Trasimenus Rome naturally turned to a dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus was clearly the best qualified leader.⁷ Both Schur⁸ and Münzer⁹ consider the appointment of Fabius and his master of horse, M. Minucius Rufus, politically significant. The unusual form of their election was, however, directly due to the uncertainty of communications with the surviving consul.¹⁰ Minucius' successful subjugation of the Histrians in 221 was probably a major factor in his nomination. Schur thinks that Minucius belonged to the Aemilio-Scipionic faction and so represented that group in his opposition to Fabius' conduct of the war. Apparently the membership of Minucius in that faction rests on the usual weak evidence.¹¹ Moreover it is unnecessary to attribute to factional politics Minucius' stand against the Fabian policy of delaying. A purely defensive strategy is never popular with either energetic commanders or with the people at home, and like C. Terentius Varro, Minucius may have wished to turn the popular discontent to his own advantage. During these critical months the Romans also sanctioned an amendment of the regulation which forbade anyone to hold the same magistracy twice within ten years.¹² This plebiscite clearly suggests that, as long as the war was fought on Italian soil, ability as a commander was to be a factor of major importance in the election of consuls.

The reaction against Fabius' purely defensive policy showed itself in the elevation of M. Minucius Rufus, his master of horse, to co-dictator; it was not checked by Hannibal's victory over Minucius.

⁷ The eleven most able ex-magistrates at this time as indicated by the number of offices and successful commands they had already held (see note 4) were Q. Fabius Maximus, later Cunctator, T. Manlius Torquatus, the conqueror of Sardinia, L. Postumius Albinus, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, and L. Aemilius Paulus among the patricians; Q. Fulvius Flaccus, Sp. Carvilius Maximus, C. Flaminius, M. Claudius Marcellus, and M. Livius Salinator among the plebeians.

⁸ *S. A.* 112f.

⁹ *Adelsp.* 79.

¹⁰ Liv. 22.8.5-6; cf. B. L. Hallward, *CAH* 8.48; G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, 3.2.45f.

¹¹ See p. 319f. Cf. Schur, *S. A.* 73, 121, 135.

¹² Liv. 27.6.7: namque Cn. Seruilio consule cum C. Flaminius alter consul ad Trasumennum cecidisset, ex auctoritate patrum ad plebem latum plebemque sciuisse ut, quoad bellum in Italia esset, ex iis qui consules fuissent quos et quotiens uellet reficiendi consules populo ius esset; cf. Liv. 7.42.2, and Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*³ 1.519, note 3.

There must have been a growing demand for less conservative commanders-in-chief. In his account of the elections for 216, Livy¹³ has given us the names of the candidates for the consulship. The plebeians were Q. Aelius Paetus, C. Atilius Serranus, and C. Terentius Varro; the patricians, M. Aemilius Lepidus, P. Cornelius Merenda, and L. Manlius Vulso. The previous year Aemilius Lepidus had been active in the protection of Lilybaeum, and Atilius Serranus with Manlius Vulso, whom he had rescued when trapped by the Boii, led the legions in Gaul until they were turned over to P. Scipio. The other candidates apparently had no better qualifications for the command against Hannibal. There were many delays in these elections. The Senate rejected the proposal of the consuls, Cn. Servilius Geminus and M. Atilius Regulus, that an interrex preside; the consequent appointment of L. Veturius Philo and M. Pomponius Matho, as dictator and master of horse, was declared invalid by the augurs on the fourteenth day of the dictatorship; C. Terentius Varro was elected under the presidency of the interrex, P. Cornelius Asina; and finally Varro held the electoral comitia in which the newly nominated L. Aemilius Paulus became his colleague. Of the consular candidates, Varro was in greatest favor with the plebs, for he had held both aedileships and had actively opposed Fabius. In order to be appointed to his later commands after his disastrous defeat at Cannae, Varro must also have been a leader of some ability.

Even though the account of these elections is under the influence of a tradition hostile to Varro, it seems extreme to discount both the senatorial opposition which Varro as a "new man" was bound to face and the fact that few candidates in Varro's position would

¹³ 22.33.9—35.7; . . . 35.1: Cum his orationibus accensa plebs esset, tribus patriciis petentibus, P. Cornelio Merenda L. Manlio Volsone M. Aemilio Lepido, duobus nobilium iam familiarum plebeiis, C. Atilio Serrano et Q. Aelio Paeto, quorum alter pontifex, alter augur erat, C. Terentius consul unus creatur, ut in manu eius essent comitia rogando collegae. Tum experta nobilitas parum fuisse virium in competitoribus eius, L. Aemilium Paulum, qui cum M. Liuius consul fuerat et damnatione collegae sui prope ambustus uraserat, infestum plebei, diu ac multum recusantem ad petitionem compellit. Is proximo comitali die concedentibus omnibus, qui cum Varrone certauerant, par magis in aduersandum quam collega datur consuli. Inde praetorum comitia habita. Creati M. Pomponius Matho et P. Furius <Philus>; Philo Romae iuri dicundo urbana sors, Pomponio inter ciues Romanos et peregrinos euenit; additi duo praetores, M. Claudius Marcellus in Siciliam, L. Postumius Albinus in Galliam. Omnes absentes creati sunt nec cuiquam eorum praeter Terentium consulem mandatus honos quem non iam antea gessisset, praeteritis aliquot fortibus ac strenuis uiris, quia in tali tempore nulli nouus magistratus uidebatur mandandus.

have hesitated to win popularity at Fabius' expense. Yet Münzer¹⁴ finds it difficult to see why except for hostile tradition, Fabius is represented as Varro's chief antagonist, and finally concludes that the consular election for 216 is an instance of party rivalry in which the Veturii, Aemilii, Cornelii, and Livii were endeavoring to win the consulship for one of their own number. Even if certain fallacies in Münzer's arguments for the membership of that clique¹⁵ are disregarded and the clique was influential in this election, it must be noted that it was not the comparatively inexperienced M. Aemilius Lepidus or P. Cornelius Merenda, but the eminent ex-consul and general L. Aemilius Paulus who won the consulship. Schur¹⁶ accepts Münzer's conclusions and points out that two of the defeated candidates, C. Atilius Serranus and L. Manlius Vulso, were partisans of Fabius. Since Varro was both an able leader and an energetic politician, while Atilius had only average ability and experience, and Manlius, after his defeat by the Boii, was hardly qualified for a major command, the observation is not significant.

What, then, caused the delays in these elections? Although competent leadership was essential against Hannibal, none of the original consular candidates seem to have had great ability as commanders. It was presumably the senators who compelled the experienced commander Paulus to run for office in place of the less able Lepidus, Merenda, and Vulso. The outgoing consuls, Atilius and Servilius, who were carrying on Fabius' tactics against Hannibal, may have foreseen a deadlock over the elections and have thought that the appointment of an interrex would expedite matters. Fabius was undoubtedly in Rome encouraging the opposition to Varro. Since Varro was the strongest candidate, that was also the easiest way to delay the elections until more experienced candidates could be persuaded to stand for office. Aemilius Paulus and the praetors were all elected *in absentia*, a fact which may help explain the delays in the elections.

The augurs in 217 were Fabius Cunctator, C. Atilius Serranus, Varro's most serious plebeian rival, Sp. Carvilius Maximus, M. Aemilius Lepidus, M. Pomponius Matho, M. Claudius Marcellus, P. Furius Philus, and probably T. Otacilius Crassus and Cn. Cor-

¹⁴ *Adesp.* 124-126.

¹⁵ See p. 319f.

¹⁶ *S. A.* 112f., 121.

nelius Lentulus.¹⁷ Is it possible that this college of augurs declared invalid the appointment of the dictator Veturius and his master of horse, M. Pomponius Matho, in the hope that they might thereby promote the safety of the State and defeat Varro? In the speech which the tribune Baebius made in behalf of Varro, he criticized the augurs, the consuls, the senators, both patrician and plebeian, and Fabius. When Varro gained the consulship against all opposition, the efforts of the *nobilitas* to find experienced leaders would naturally have been renewed. Not only the consul Aemilius Paulus but also the praetors, P. Furius Philus, M. Claudius Marcellus, L. Postumius Albinus, and perhaps also their colleague M. Pomponius Matho, were ex-consuls who had served as commanders.¹⁸ As far as we are told, there was no event or report which would account for the willingness of these ex-consuls to run for the praetorship when no one of them had stood for the consulship. Yet the advisability of securing such competent leaders at that time was beyond question. Both consuls were needed for operations against Hannibal, and the Gauls in northern Italy had to be watched. In fact the area of the war had extended, and the number of legions was increased.¹⁹ It will be recalled that the praetors, Marcellus, P. Furius Philus, and possibly M. Pomponius Matho, were also augurs. Unless the interest of the augurs in these consular and praetorian elections is pure coincidence, the evidence seems to indicate that a group of Roman senators including a majority of the augural college were working together for the election of experienced commanders. This group appears to have included members of all the particular cliques which Schur has found active during the Second Punic War.

To meet the demands of the military situation at the beginning of 215, the Romans had also prorogued the imperium of all the commanders who had proved their competence the previous year. Because they had in office so many experienced commanders, the Romans were able, upon their disastrous defeat at Cannae, to send Marcellus to Canusium to rally the survivors, and have Furius

¹⁷ Bardt, *Die Priester der vier grossen Kollegien der römisch-republikanische Zeit (Programm, Berlin, 1871)* 11, 19–21.

¹⁸ See note 13. A M. Pomponius Matho, consul in 231, campaigned in Sardinia; cf. Drumann-Groebe, *Geschichte Roms*² 5.4, note 7.

¹⁹ In tracing the relation of the commanders to the course of the war, I am much indebted to J. E. A. Crake for his keen analysis of Livy's lists of legions in his unpublished Johns Hopkins dissertation, *Archival Material in Livy, 218–167 B.C.*, 1939.

Philus give Otacilius the support he needed in his naval operations. Varro reached Rome promptly and appointed M. Iunius Pera dictator. New legions were recruited including slaves, and under Pera, his master of horse Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, and Marcellus, Rome weathered the first months after her appalling losses at Cannae.

Among the particularly competent leaders elected for 215 were Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher. Gracchus owed his success partly to the speech made in his favor by M. Iunius Pera, who was presiding over the electoral assembly. As master of horse, Gracchus had, however, risen ably to the challenge of the crisis, and he lived up to the responsibility of the consulship. Since Sempronii and Claudii had frequently been colleagues in the consulship, and since in the next century the Gracchi both married granddaughters of the C. Claudius Centho who had been consul with their father in 177, Schur²⁰ assumes that their families were political allies. He finds corroboration for this alliance in the following incidents. The consuls of 224 were Q. Fulvius Flaccus and T. Manlius Torquatus, for whose abdication from the censorship of 231 Schur²¹ considers Fabius Maximus responsible. We know that they had to abdicate *vitio creati*, that Fabius, already augur, and M. Sempronius Tuditanus became censors in 230, and that in 217 Fabius had reason to encourage the augurs to block the election of Varro. But that censorship was an office of far less significance than the consulship for 216, and the great frequency of invalid appointments and consequent abdications is a warning that ulterior motives should not be too readily ascribed to the augurs. Moreover, is it probable that in 231 Fabius had sufficient influence in the augural college to secure the verdict of *vitio creati*? Yet Schur concludes that the rejected censors of 231 must have reached the consulship of 224 with the help of organized opposition to the Fabian clique. According to Schur, that opposition also secured the censorship of 224 for M. Iunius Pera and C. Claudius Centho. On the basis of this evidence, M. Iunius Pera, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher are taken to represent a coalition against Fabius and his faction at the elections of 215. The assumption hardly seems justified.²²

²⁰ S. A. 115f.; *H* 59 (1924) 470-472; cf. Münzer, *Adelsp.* 192f., 209, 257-281.

²¹ S. A. 111f., 116.

²² Cf. p. 319f.

The higher magistrates elected or continued in command for 215 had to lead the Romans in direct conflict with Hannibal, in the protection of strategic points, and in operations against the towns of southern Italy which had revolted. As Gracchus' colleague in the consulship, the people chose L. Postumius Albinus, trained in two consular campaigns and then serving in Gaul. The four praetorships were awarded to Q. Fulvius Flaccus, already an ex-censor and twice consul; to M. Valerius Laevinus, who had previously held that office; to Ap. Claudius Pulcher, who had stood firm in the crisis after Cannae; and to Q. Mucius Scaevola. In tribute to his successful skirmishes with Hannibal after Cannae, the people first granted Marcellus proconsular imperium, and then successfully supported his election as consul in place of Postumius who had been killed in Gaul. Because it thundered when Marcellus entered office, the senators claimed that the gods were displeased at the choice of two plebeian consuls. The Senate did not wish in the midst of a serious war to risk any reflection on its prestige. The augurs declared the election invalid, Marcellus had to abdicate, and Fabius succeeded him. Both Marcellus and Fabius belonged to the augural college. Fabius and the Roman cause gained by this arrangement, and Marcellus lost little for he was again given proconsular imperium. At the time of his election, Fabius' only serious rival would have been T. Manlius Torquatus, and Fabius was obviously better qualified to fight Hannibal. In view of the military situation, party politics were a minor factor in the elections for 215.

At the time of the elections for 214, Spain and Sardinia were no cause for worry. The growing unrest in Sicily which followed the death of King Hiero cannot have yet been very serious, for Otacilius was in Rome canvassing for the consulship. The plan of campaign in Italy called for two consular armies to oppose Hannibal at his main centers of operation, and smaller forces to check defection and block the enemies' supply of provisions and recruits. The consuls chosen for 214 by the century which voted first were M. Aemilius Regillus and T. Otacilius Crassus. Fabius, as presiding officer, stopped the voting and criticized the nominees. Of the criticism put in his mouth by Livy,²³ only the argument that the consuls

²³ 24.7.10—9.11; Otacilius could not have been negligent of his duties since he was reelected to the praetorship and sent back to his important naval command, and Aemilius' obligations as flamen Martialis (not Quirinalis, cf. Liv. 29.38.6; Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*³ 1.491, note 2) would have handicapped him less than his lack of military experience.

should be Hannibal's equals could have been taken seriously. Yet the centuries voted again and unanimously elected Marcellus and Fabius. The reelection of a presiding officer is extraordinary, but it finds its justification in the plebiscite of 217.²⁴ Unless the voters believed that the choice of Fabius and Marcellus was best, it is strange that there was no dissenting century and that they also promoted the younger Fabius, then curule aedile, directly to the praetorship. Münzer²⁵ and Schur²⁶ stress the extraordinary aspects of this election and accuse Fabius of the most brazen party intrigue. Such a conclusion is possible only if the demands of the war²⁷ are disregarded. Once the State was assured of competent commanders-in-chief, able men with the usual military training were adequate for praetorian posts. Yet apparently in order to keep experienced magistrates in charge at Rome and of the fleet, Q. Fulvius Flaccus and T. Otacilius Crassus were reelected. Fulvius received *extra sortem* the *provincia urbana*, and Otacilius resumed his successful naval command.

Under the Scipios Roman successes in Spain had continued during 214, Syracuse was keeping Marcellus fully occupied, Laevinus had gone into action against Philip, and Sardinia was quiet. It would hardly have been reasonable to change any of these commands the next year when leaders were needed for fifteen legions in Italy. Again the chief question to be decided at the polls was who should match wits with Hannibal. The consuls chosen for 213 were the younger Q. Fabius Maximus and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. Gracchus unquestionably deserved this second consulship after three years of able leadership and his recent victory over Hanno. Military tribune at Cannae, curule aedile in 215, and then praetor in Luceria and Apulia where he captured Acuca, the younger Fabius did not owe his advancement entirely to his father's influence. But with the elder Fabius as legate, the son was a much stronger candidate for a consular command against Hannibal. In the electoral comitia for 213 Fabius Cunctator again presided, and Schur²⁸ finds in the promotion of the younger Fabius over the better

²⁴ See note 12 and text; Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*⁸ 500f., note 1.

²⁵ *Adelsp.* 74.

²⁶ *S. A.* 113.

²⁷ Cf. Liv. 24.9.10: Tempus ac necessitas belli ac discrimen summae rerum faciebant ne quis aut exemplum exquireret aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem (Fabium) haberet.

²⁸ *S. A.* 113f.

qualified Ap. Claudius Pulcher evidence of a political scandal which was soon to cause the downfall of the Fabian clique, and in Ti. Gracchus a representative of the rival Fulvio-Claudian faction. But Ap. Claudius did not canvass for the consulship until 212,²⁹ and the arguments for Gracchus' membership in the Fulvio-Claudian clique are inconclusive.³⁰ Furthermore no available candidate would have offered either Gracchus or Fabius with his father as legate any serious competition.³¹

For the Romans 213 was a year of no particular note in Spain, Greece, Sardinia, and northern Italy, nor with the fleet. The commands in these regions were all continued for 212. The comparative inactivity in central and southern Italy, however, naturally bred dissatisfaction,³² and the time was ripe for consular candidates to win votes by promising a more vigorous prosecution of the war. Ap. Claudius Pulcher canvassed in person.³³ His part in the siege of Syracuse, though not brilliant, had furthered Roman control. Q. Fulvius Flaccus was an excellent and trusted executive. Against two such able candidates from whom a new offensive might be expected, few leaders had much chance. The Fabii, and M. Aemilius Lepidus, who had held the praetorian command in Apulia, doubtless bore the brunt of the people's discontent. Ti. Gracchus probably owed the prorogation of his imperium to his skill with the legions of slaves. Rome now had all her able experienced generals in the field except T. Manlius Torquatus, whose vigor was failing, M. Livius Salinator, who had been exiled, and Fabius Cunctator, who was again out of favor. In view of the general situation, this election has little significance for party affiliations even though Gracchus had appointed C. Claudius Centho dictator to hold the elections and under his presidency it was his nephew Ap. Claudius Pulcher and his master of horse, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who won the consulship.

The main objectives for 211 were the capture of Capua and Syracuse. The prorogued commands of Marcellus, Ap. Claudius and Fulvius ensured those achievements. The commanders in Gaul, Greece, Spain, and of the fleet off Sicily were kept at their

²⁹ Liv. 24.39.12-13 with Weissenborn's note; De Sanctis, *op. cit.* (see note 10) 3.2.329-334.

³⁰ See p. 325f.; cf. p. 319f.

³¹ Cf. Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 50.

³² De Sanctis, *op. cit.* (see note 10) 3.2.287f.; B. L. Hallward, *CAH* 8.78.

³³ See note 29.

posts. In the untroubled provinces of Sardinia and western Sicily, praetors could replace the faithful Mucius Scaevola and P. Lentulus. Among the consuls and praetors elected for 211 had to be found commanders to replace Gracchus who had been killed and Cn. Fulvius who had been exiled for treason. All the successful candidates seem to have been insufficiently qualified. As praetor at Suessula, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus had had little chance to gain military skill. Neither P. Sulpicius Galba nor any of the praetors had held important commands, and prior to his consulship Galba had had no curule office. But few stronger candidates were available.³⁴ Would Fabius Cunctator have wished, or been persuaded, to hold a clearly secondary command? His son had turned out to be a general of little distinction. Livius Salinator was still in exile. T. Manlius Torquatus would probably have refused the consulship for reasons of health as he did the following year. Schur³⁵ considers the election of Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba to the consulship and the sending of C. Claudius Nero to Spain a double victory for the Fulvio-Claudian clique. But once again the evidence for the political connections of the Claudii with the Fulvii and the Sulpicii Galbae³⁶ involves certain fallacies.³⁷ C. Claudius Nero was sent to Spain with soldiers which the fall of Capua had freed for service elsewhere. He was a good soldier, and it was natural to send with these reinforcements one of their own commanding officers. Ap. Claudius had been mortally wounded, and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had the training to deal with administrative problems, was entitled to complete the settlement at Capua. We have already seen that the increasing scarcity of superior commanders was a major factor in the choice of Nero and the consuls of 211.

In the electoral comitia for 210 the *iuniores* of the *centuria praerogativa* designated as consuls T. Manlius Torquatus and T. Otacilius Crassus. Manlius refused nomination, and the *iuniores* referred the question of candidates to their *seniores*. After consultation, the latter recommended Fabius Cunctator and M. Claudius Marcellus, with M. Valerius Laevinus, who had ably opposed Philip, as an alternate patrician candidate. Reasons for their recommenda-

³⁴ See note 31.

³⁵ S. A. 117.

³⁶ Schur, S. A. 114-117; Münzer, *Adelsp.* 192f., 209, 266-268.

³⁷ See pp. 325 and 319f.

tions are not hard to discover. No other available patricians had successfully held major commands, and Marcellus certainly outshone T. Otacilius Crassus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the only other plebeians with years of generalship. Moreover, Fulvius and Otacilius were already in positions where they could serve their country most effectively, Fulvius at Capua and Otacilius with the fleet. Why then were Fulvius and Otacilius nominated by the *iuniores* of the century which voted first? The fall of Capua and Syracuse had brought a welcome hope of victory, and with Manlius Torquatus, an ex-consul of no mean ability, was associated the closing of the gates of Janus (235). Otacilius, after six years of successful naval command, deserved the honor of a consulship. There must also have been a feeling that Marcellus and Fabius had had a lion's share of the higher magistracies. Fabius in particular had pushed himself forward. Then in 213 Fabius and his son had accomplished so little in Italy that the people were naturally very dissatisfied. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the voters preferred Laevinus to Fabius. If Manlius Torquatus really did recommend the nomination of Fabius and Marcellus,³⁸ his motive was probably not party allegiance. At least it may be seriously questioned how much indirect bonds of colleagueship between Manlii and friends of the Fabii³⁹ would have influenced him in favor of Fabius. Even if Manlius Torquatus did belong to a Fabian clique and Laevinus to a Fulvio-Claudian, the circumstances would have made such political affiliations very secondary in the consular elections for 210.

The deaths of Ap. Claudius at Capua, the Scipios in Spain, and Centumalus in Apulia had made the shortage of superior commanders among the Romans even more acute.⁴⁰ It is not surprising that Marcellus and Laevinus recalled M. Livius Salinator from exile and that the question of the command in Spain was not yet settled. C. Claudius Nero, sent to Spain after the fall of Capua with preliminary reinforcements,⁴¹ had held the Roman position north of the Ebro without further gain or loss. The prime factors in preparing for more aggressive action were sufficient troops and a leader whom the Spaniards would respect. Nero, the best quali-

³⁸ Cf. Liv. 26.22.3-11 and Schur, S. A. 123f.

³⁹ Münzer, *Adelsp.* 59-61, 75f.; Schur, S. A. 108, 113, 116; cf. pp. 325 and 319f.

⁴⁰ Cf. note 31.

⁴¹ Cf. Liv. 26.17.1-2 with Weissenborn's note.

fied of the ex-praetors, could very easily have been kept in command, but he does not seem to have had the personality and diplomacy which were essential in dealing with the Spaniards.⁴² The available ex-consuls were either rather old to undergo the rigors of Spanish warfare, or they had not shown any great ability in their latest commands. Although relatively inexperienced, the young Scipio had certain personal assets.⁴³ He had proved his ability to inspire confidence when he rallied the soldiers after their defeat at Cannae, and the Spaniards, who had greatly esteemed the elder Scipios, would be partial to him. On the day set for the meeting of the electoral assembly, only Scipio presented his candidacy, and he was unanimously elected.⁴⁴ Schur⁴⁵ believes that factional politics played an important role in Scipio's appointment to this command. Yet he gives no evidence other than that implied in the membership of the group. Although the Cornelii Scipiones and the Aemilii Paulii were bound by close family ties,⁴⁶ the arguments for the party affiliations of the Cornelii, Aemilii, Veturii, Livii, and P. Licinius Crassus are subject to the usual limitations.⁴⁷ Neither should any political significance be attached to the fact that P. Licinius Crassus and L. Veturius Philo, when censors, compelled M. Livius Salinator, who had been recalled from exile by the consuls, Marcellus and Laevinus, to resume his place among the senators. Livius was reinstated at a time when there was an acute shortage of experienced generals. In 205 Crassus did not dispute Scipio's claim to the consular province of Africa because as pontifex maximus he was still expected to remain in Italy. His election as pontifex maximus in 212 owed little or nothing to the presiding magistrate, M. Cornelius Cethegus.⁴⁸ Therefore considering the uncertain strength of the Aemilio-Scipionic faction at this time, such a political alliance does not seem to have been a factor of great weight in the appointment of Scipio. Inasmuch as

⁴² Mommsen, *History of Rome* (tr. by Dickson, New York, 1900) 2.324; Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 50, cites Liv. 29.37.5-16.

⁴³ Cf. Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 50f.

⁴⁴ Liv. 26.18.1-11. Since the question of a commander for Spain had been previously referred to the Assembly (Liv. 26.2.5-6), a complete rejection of Livy's account of Scipio's election (E. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* [Halle, 1924] 2.431-433) seems extreme (cf. Haywood, *op. cit.* [see note 3] 53, note 16).

⁴⁵ S. A. 23f., 124f.

⁴⁶ See note 4. Cf. Münzer, *Adelsp.* 106f.

⁴⁷ See p. 319f.; cf. Münzer, *Adelsp.* 124-129, 229-237; Schur, S. A. 118-123.

⁴⁸ See note 88 and text. Cf. Schur, S. A. 119.

Nero did not have a temperament suited to handling the Spaniards and there was a shortage of experienced leaders in Italy, the Senate probably felt that it was better to have Nero at home.⁴⁹ He was in line for the consulship and may even have preferred to be near enough to Rome to canvass in person. It is true that Nero was not appointed to high command until 207,⁵⁰ but he probably did not return in time for the consular election for 209, and in 208 he was eliminated by the sudden reaction in favor of Marcellus and Crispinus.⁵¹ Marcellus apparently thought well enough of Nero to have him serve as his lieutenant in operations against Hannibal in 209. There were no other openings for commanders of Nero's ability until 207.

Schur⁵² thinks that the Fulvio-Claudian faction was trying through M. Valerius Laevinus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, its most prominent surviving members,⁵³ to control the consular elections for 209.⁵⁴ The presidency of the electoral comitia did fall to Laevinus, but Marcellus, the other consul had first notified the Senate that he could not leave his post against Hannibal. When, on the report of an impending invasion from Carthage, the Senate ordered Laevinus to appoint a dictator to hold the elections and return immediately to Sicily, though supposedly a Fulvio-Claudian partisan, he refused to make or sanction any legal appointment. Therefore it was Marcellus, considered a supporter of Fabius,⁵⁵ who confirmed the nomination of Q. Fulvius Flaccus which had been made by the *concilium plebis*. Under the presidency of Fulvius, he and Fabius were elected consuls. The tribunes challenged Fulvius' self-nomination, but the Senate granted him the requisite exemption. That dispensation was legal,⁵⁶ and it is unnecessary to assume that party influence operated behind the objection of the tribunes because they were the regular champions of constitutionality. Finally with Marcellus already in command, Laevinus

⁴⁹ This recall was not a serious criticism of Nero (cf. B. L. Hallward, *CAH* 8.84) since with only preliminary reinforcements Nero could not have been expected to undertake a successful offensive (Haywood, *op. cit.* [see note 3] 51; H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* [Cambridge, 1930] 53-55).

⁵⁰ H. H. Scullard, *JRS* 23 (1933) 79f.

⁵¹ Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 48-50.

⁵² S. A. 125f.

⁵³ On the inconclusive arguments for their membership, see pp. 325 and 319f.

⁵⁴ Cf. Liv. 27.4.1-4, 5.8-19.

⁵⁵ Münzer, *Adelsp.* 73-76; Schur, S. A. 109.

⁵⁶ See note 12 and text.

in charge of important naval operations off Sicily, and M. Livius Salinator still obdurate, Fulvius and Fabius Cunctator were the only experienced generals of superior ability not in active service. Alarm over the report of imminent invasion undoubtedly favored their election.

The most effective fighting of the year was the capture of New Carthage by Scipio. Nothing of note was accomplished by the Romans in Sicily, Sardinia, or Greece. While Marcellus and Fulvius kept Hannibal occupied, Fabius won back Tarentum and captured Manduria. Then Marcellus suffered a reverse, was formally accused, and went to Rome to defend himself. That defense, a *commemoratio rerum suarum*, brought Marcellus not only acquittal, but also election to his fifth consulship with T. Quinctius Crispinus, his legate at Syracuse, as his colleague. In these elections Fabius Cunctator is said to have accomplished the downfall of his old antagonist, Q. Fulvius Flaccus.⁵⁷ But since Marcellus, Fulvius' successor as consul, was the best qualified candidate for the consular command against Hannibal, his connections with the Fabian clique would not have been a major factor in his success. On the other hand, Fulvius, one of the oldest ex-consuls in active service, held during 208 an administrative post at Capua which was better suited to his ability at that time. T. Quinctius Crispinus apparently owed some of his votes to Marcellus' support, but more significant was the scarcity of superior commanders. Fabius Cunctator, like Fulvius, was no longer in his prime, and during the Hannibalic War no one held a second consulship who had not achieved distinction in a major command.

The two chief factors which influenced the elections for 207 were the death of Marcellus and Crispinus and the reports of Hasdrubal's approach at the head of a second invading army. According to Livy,⁵⁸ when the senators were looking around for suitable consuls, C. Claudius Nero stood out far above the others. This was true. There was sure to be strenuous fighting with two Carthaginian armies in Italy, and for this, their age made Fabius Cunctator and Q. Fulvius Flaccus less fit. Valerius Laevinus was needed to direct the fleet off Sicily where the recent naval victory⁵⁹ had proved his competence. M. Cornelius Cethegus and P. Sem-

⁵⁷ Schur, S. A. 127.

⁵⁸ 27.34.1-15.

⁵⁹ De Sanctis, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 3.2.476, note 52; B. L. Hallward, *CAH* 8.92.

pronius Tuditanus were able leaders, but they had not had the military experience necessary to hold the important consulship of 207. Nero had fought at Capua, in Spain, and under Marcellus. During the previous year the experienced plebeian general, M. Livius Salinator, had finally broken his stubborn silence, and both the Senate and the people, recognizing his value to the State, elected him as Nero's colleague. Schur⁶⁰ claims that Fabius, finding no suitable candidate in his own clique, coöperated with the Aemilio-Scipionic faction in the support of Livius. It is true that T. Quinctius Crispinus, a Fabian adherent by virtue of his close association with Marcellus, appointed as dictator to hold the elections, T. Manlius Torquatus, who named as his master of horse, C. Servilius Geminus. Schur⁶¹ includes the Servilii in the Aemilio-Scipionic clique and the Manlii in the Fabian because members of their families had preceded, followed, or held office with men similarly associated with the respective factions. It seems superfluous to mention again the fallacies of this type of argument.⁶² Moreover since the celebration of votive games was among the duties of this dictatorship and C. Servilius Geminus had given games during both his aedileships,⁶³ it is possible that Manlius Torquatus was merely seeking a competent assistant. Because Fabius knew well the dangers arising from the friction and jealousy of colleagues, the prime motive in his efforts to ensure the reconciliation of Livius and Nero was surely the good of the State. Finally, even if the Q. Fabius who was legate to Livius was the son of Fabius Cunctator,⁶⁴ there is no reason to conclude with Schur that Livius was politically aligned with Fabius.

After the annihilation of Hasdrubal and his army, Hannibal withdrew to Bruttium. The elections for 206 reflect the joy and relief of the Romans. Two of the three messengers of victory, L. Veturius Philo and Q. Caecilius Metellus, became consuls. Metellus was master of horse to the dictator who presided at the elections, and he had held both aedileships. This combination of offices gave him a distinct advantage over P. Licinus Varus, the third bearer of glad tidings. Besides, both the *equites* and the consuls had supported the candidacy of Philo and Metellus. Not

⁶⁰ S. A. 127f.

⁶¹ S. A. 122f., cf. 129f.; Münzer, *Adelsp.* 136f.

⁶² See p. 319f.

⁶³ Liv. 27.21.9, 36.8.

⁶⁴ Cf. Münzer, *RE*, s.v. "Fabius," No. 103.

only had Livius appointed them messengers of victory, but Nero had named Livius dictator to hold the electoral comitia,⁶⁵ and Livius had in turn made Metellus his master of horse. In view of the friction which existed between Nero and Livius, Schur⁶⁶ has concluded that Nero was compelled to appoint Livius to this dictatorship. This possibility, however, seems negligible when we recall on what slight grounds Laevinus refused in 210 to make a legal nomination for that office.⁶⁷ It seems more probable that Nero, since he favored the candidates most likely to win and perhaps wished to return promptly to his command against Hannibal, agreed to the simple plan of nominating his colleague. The fact that Nero's imperium was not prorogued for 206 is no proof of political defeat,⁶⁸ for with the reduction of the legions in active service he was no longer needed.

Nothing significant was accomplished by the Romans during 206 except that Scipio terminated his campaign in Spain. He then returned victorious to Rome with plans for an invasion of Africa, and gained the consulship easily. It was natural that the people welcomed the prospect of more vigorous action when a year after the victory at the Metaurus, Hannibal was still entrenched in southern Italy. The pontifex maximus P. Licinius Crassus, a man of exceptional ability,⁶⁹ became Scipio's colleague. Previous generalship was less important this year, for during 206 the consular armies under the comparatively inexperienced commanders, L. Veturius Philo and Q. Caecilius Metellus, had proved fully adequate to cope with Hannibal's greatly restricted manoeuvres. Since Scipio had the full support of the plebs,⁷⁰ the influence of an Aemilio-Scipionic clique and of the magistrate presiding at these consular elections⁷¹ would have been unimportant. Rome's military arrangements for 205 were satisfactory. The consuls of 204 were P. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Cornelius Cethegus. Although

⁶⁵ For some reason it must have been previously decided that this election should be held by a dictator (Liv. 28.10.1-2: Cum comitiorum tempus appeteret et per dictatorem comitia haberi placuisset, C. Claudius consul M. Livium collegam dictatorem dixit . . .).

⁶⁶ S. A. 128f.

⁶⁷ Liv. 27.5.8-19.

⁶⁸ Cf. Schur, S. A. 129.

⁶⁹ Cf. Liv. 30.1.3-6. Crassus had already been censor and praetor.

⁷⁰ Liv. 28.38.6-10, 45.2-8; Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 53; B. L. Hallward, *CAH* 8.96; De Sanctis, *op. cit.* (see note 10) 3.2.506-509.

⁷¹ Cf. Schur, S. A. 120-123; Münzer, *Adelsp.* 184-191. See p. 319f.

neither had yet held all the major offices, they had both been censors. Cethegus had few rivals since none of the patrician ex-praetors who had not already been consuls excelled him in military or executive experience. The situation did not call for the election of an ex-consul. Tuditanus surpassed any plebeian competitor as a magistrate and a commander, and at the time of the elections, the Romans may have expected to keep this capable leader in Greece to watch Philip.

The major political issue of 205 and 204 was Scipio's proposal to invade Africa. It was a bold scheme in view of Rome's long, depleting struggle and the continued presence of Hannibal in Italy. On this question Fabius Cunctator and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, whom Livy⁷² makes the spokesmen for the opposition, naturally presented the conservative view. For fear that Scipio might be invested with the African command by a plebiscite overriding an adverse senatorial decree, the Senate finally conferred on him the desired imperium. The attempt to hinder Scipio's plan by not authorizing the levy of troops was probably an effort to emphasize the powers of the Senate. Scipio's failure to check the oppression of the Locrians by his legate, Q. Pleminius, afforded the conservatives another opportunity to attack Scipio and discredit the plan to invade Africa. Undoubtedly the presence of M. Pomponius Matho, Scipio's cousin, and Q. Metellus, his staunch friend, on the commission sent to investigate the charges against Scipio furthered the verdict of acquittal. But surely Scipio's friends and relatives needed no political motive to rally to his support in this case. Metellus also presided over the electoral comitia in which M. Cornelius Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus became consuls for 204. He would naturally have exerted his influence in behalf of those candidates who would support Scipio's venture,⁷³ but little party significance should be attributed to this influence since the wishes of Scipio would have carried considerable weight of themselves. Crassus' nomination of Metellus as dictator to hold the elections was very natural. Crassus could not go to Rome himself because he was ill. The army of Metellus was no longer needed in Bruttium, and presumably that general would have been returning to Rome. In the clash of politics over the invasion of Africa, the particular cliques which Schur describes were relatively insignificant.

⁷² 28.40.1—45.9.

⁷³ Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 55f.

The elections and prorogations for 203 clearly reflect the needs of the hour. The consuls, Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Servilius Geminus, were able executives. Both had held the praetorship and the curule aedileship; Geminus had also been legate, plebeian aedile, and plebeian tribune. The more experienced generals Sempronius Tuditanus and Cornelius Cethegus continued to serve against Hannibal and Mago. Scipio's success in Africa was steady, and by the end of 203 the Carthaginians had recalled both Hannibal and Mago. In 202 Scipio won the decisive victory at Zama, and peace was concluded in 201. Therefore it was natural that the number of military commands decreased and that even the major magistrates for the last two years of the war were men of average ability and more executive than military experience. The plebeian consul of 201, P. Aelius Paetus, had made the normal advance through the *cursus honorum*. Ti. Claudius Nero, consul in 202, had not been aedile, and neither his consular colleague, M. Servilius Geminus, nor his successor in 201, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, had held the praetorship. But M. Servilius was master of horse to the dictator who held the elections for 202, and Ti. Nero and Cn. Lentulus did not win the consulship against great competition since of all the praetors of 207–202 only five, including Cn. Servilius Caepio and Ti. Nero himself, were patricians.

The choice of consuls and consular provinces is the main clue to possible political groupings from 203–201. Although the Servilii were friendly to the Cornelian *gens*, this relationship was not important in the election to the consulship for 203 of Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Servilius Geminus. The record of their family during the Second Punic War shows that they had a claim to that honor in their own name. Schur⁷⁴ has argued that the Servilii changed over from the Aemilio-Scipionic clique to the opposing faction, but Haywood⁷⁵ has already shown that the evidence for this change of allegiance is very weak. When Cn. Caepio started out for Africa in pursuit of Hannibal, he was probably seeking an opportunity to win military renown for himself. Not only may he also have considered his province where Hannibal was,⁷⁶ but throughout the war at least two generals with consular or pro-consular imperium had been kept in command against Hannibal.

⁷⁴ S. A. 129–131; cf. 62–68; Münzer, *Adelsp.* 143–145.

⁷⁵ *Op. cit.* (see note 3) 56–58.

⁷⁶ Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 56.

The Senate, would not, however, have expected Cn. Caepio to proceed to Africa without its sanction, and at the time of his recall there may have still been hope that Scipio could carry through the first peace settlement. The subsequent return to the policy of two commanders against Hannibal was natural. Even if the Carthaginians' violation of the truce was not known in Rome when the Senate declared Africa a consular province for 202, the growing probability of renewed hostilities under Hannibal would have justified sending a consul to aid Scipio. Moreover it was the consul's right to hold command in the major theater of a war.⁷⁷ The election of Ti. Claudius Nero and M. Servilius Geminus as consuls under the presidency of the dictator P. Sulpicius Galba does not prove that the Servilii were politically aligned with the Claudii.⁷⁸ Since Galba had been appointed by C. Servilius Geminus and had named M. Servilius Geminus as his master of horse, he was clearly on friendly terms with them, but his connections with the Claudii⁷⁹ are politically insignificant.⁸⁰ Ti. Claudius Nero was in line for the consulship and probably owed his election both to his famous cousin, C. Claudius Nero, and to Scipio, whom he had assisted in 204.⁸¹ Through the dictator C. Servilius Geminus, appointed by his brother Marcus, the Servilii may have again influenced the consular elections. The successful candidates for 201 were P. Aelius Paetus, master of horse to that dictator, and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, but there were many delays in their election. Schur⁸² has suggested that the opposition to the Servilii, who had become members of the Fulvio-Claudian faction,⁸³ used the augurs to obstruct this election. But if the augurs were responsible,⁸⁴ they probably favored Lentulus and Paetus, who belonged to the college.⁸⁵ In regard to the command against Hannibal, the Senate again upheld the policy of two commanders provided that the peace terms after Zama were not concluded, or if the plebs voted that a consul should bring the army home from Africa. By again

⁷⁷ Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 57f.

⁷⁸ Cf. Münzer, *Adelsp.* 143f.; Schur, *S. A.* 130f.

⁷⁹ See note 78.

⁸⁰ Cf. p. 329.

⁸¹ Haywood, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 57.

⁸² *S. A.* 66.

⁸³ See notes 74 and 75, and text.

⁸⁴ Livy (30.39.4—40.5) does not mention the augurs (cf. Liv. 22.33.11—12, 34.10; 23.31.13).

⁸⁵ See note 17.

referring the question of Scipio's command to the tribal Assembly the Senate had made sure that Lentulus, the only consul to press his claim, would not supersede Scipio. Schur⁸⁶ believes that during the African campaign there was a gradual consolidation of the aristocracy against Scipio's growing power. Yet every instance of so-called opposition is adequately explained as individual ambition, the normal right of the consuls, and a reasonable military policy.

The choice of the important civil magistrates, elected or appointed during the Second Punic War, also reflected the demands of the military situation. The first of these appointments was that of the triumviri mensarii, who were to solve the immense problem of finances which had risen by 216. The three appointees were L. Aemilius Papus, censor with Flaminius when they sponsored an extensive building program, M. Atilius Regulus, who had just been excused from further military service on account of his age, and the plebeian tribune, L. Scribonius Libo. This same year, after the overwhelming losses at Cannae, it was imperative to make a new *lectio senatus*. For this purpose the consul Varro, by order of the Senate, appointed as dictator without a master of horse the oldest living ex-censor, M. Fabius Buteo. M. Atilius Regulus and L. Furius Philus, the censors of 214, were both ex-consuls disqualified for active military service, Atilius by his age, and Furius by the severe wound which he had received in a raid on Africa. The duties of the following censorship in 210 were not completed before the death of L. Veturius Philo; his colleague P. Licinius Crassus had to abdicate. Veturius had been the highest ranking patrician of the qualified ex-magistrates, and Crassus' prestige as pontifex maximus had probably won him this appointment over the possible plebeian rivals.⁸⁷ Since Veturius and Crassus had performed none of the major duties of the office, censors were again elected the following year, and the successful candidates were two praetorians, M. Cornelius Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus. Both Cethegus and Tuditanus had held commands and were in line for the consulship, but the Romans had summoned the veteran generals, Fabius Cunctator and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, to head their military forces. Some recognition of Tuditanus and Cethegus was not in-

⁸⁶ S. A. 62-68.

⁸⁷ On the qualifications for the censorship, see Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*³ 1.520, notes 1 and 2; 548f., note 1.

appropriate; they were undoubtedly as competent as any available rivals. The last censors during the Hannibalic War were C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator. Their victory at the Metaurus had put them above all other possible candidates. In 212 P. Licinius Crassus, who had not yet held any curule office, was elected pontifex maximus over two formidable rivals, T. Manlius Torquatus, the conqueror of Sardinia, and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had just been elected to his third consulship. Münzer⁸⁸ is probably right in deciding that Torquatus lost out because his gruff personality made him unpopular, and Fulvius because he had not been a member of the college long enough to be well versed in pontifical lore. Torquatus and Fulvius had both held successful commands, and perhaps this was an additional factor in Crassus' favor. Certainly the scarcity of military leaders from 211–207 accounted for some of the delay in appointing the flamen dialis and the rex sacrorum, priests whose office disqualified them for military service.⁸⁹ During the war three experienced generals, C. Claudius Nero, C. Terentius Varro, and M. Valerius Laevinus headed important embassies, but they all served when they were no longer needed on the field of battle.

Factional politics in some form undoubtedly existed at Rome during the Second Punic War. But in his discussion of the Fabian, Fulvio-Claudian, and Aemilio-Scipionic cliques and the political influence which they exercised, Schur has not only used a method which involves certain fallacies, but he has also underestimated the demand for competent leadership which the war with Hannibal created. In fact the special appointments, numerous reelections, frequent prorogations, and special exemptions were all direct consequences of the particular emergencies. Often the successful candidates were the only really qualified leaders. Therefore only an analysis which shows the relationship of the magistrates to the demands of the war puts in its proper perspective a picture of the political rivalry at Rome between 218 and 201.

⁸⁸ *Adelsp.* 186f.

⁸⁹ Klose, *Römische Priesterfasten* (Diss. Breslau, 1910) 1.11–13.